IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT CHARLESTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : Criminal Action

Plaintiff, : No. 2:21-cr-00127

:*** REDACTED *** RAYMOND DUGAN,

Defendant. : APPEAL TRANSCRIPT

X

TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. GOODWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE IN CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA OCTOBER 27, 2022

APPEARANCES:

v.

For the Government: Julie White, Esq.

Assistant United States Attorney

United States Attorney's Office

P.O. Box 1713

Charleston, WV 25326-1713

For the Defendant: David Schles, Esq.

Suite 306

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Probation Officer: Kiara Carper

Kimberly Kaufman, RMR, CRR, CRC Federal Official Court Reporter 300 Virginia Street East, Room 6610 Charleston, WV 25301

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript produced by computer.

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PROCEEDINGS had before The Honorable Joseph R.
Goodwin, Judge, United States District Court, Southern
District of West Virginia, in Charleston, West Virginia, on
October 27, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., as follows:
          THE COURT: Good morning.
          THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: The matter before the
Court is The United States of America v. Raymond Dugan,
Criminal Action No. 2:21-cr-127.
          THE COURT: Is the United States ready?
          MS. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Is the defendant ready?
          MR. SCHLES: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Will the defendant and defense counsel
please stand.
    Madam Clerk, would you administer the oath to
Mr. Dugan.
              RAYMOND DUGAN, DEFENDANT, SWORN
          THE COURT: Mr. Dugan, on August 2nd, 2022, you
were convicted of accessing with the intent to view child
pornography in violation of 18 United States Code Sections
2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) as charged in a single-count
superseding indictment returned against you by the grand
jury.
     Since the time of your conviction the probation
department has conducted a presentence investigation of you
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       and prepared a presentence investigation report.
 2
            Have you had an opportunity to read that report and
 3
       discuss it with your lawyer?
                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I have.
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 5
                 THE COURT: Mr. Schles, have you had an
 6
       opportunity to read it and discuss it with your client?
 7
                 MR. SCHLES: I have, Your Honor.
 8
                 THE COURT: Having done so is there any reason why
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       disposition should not take place today?
10
                 MR. SCHLES: No, Your Honor.
11
            I would bring to the Court's attention that the
12
       government and the defense have agreed to ask the Court to
13
       defer final decision on the restitution judgment.
14
            The agreement is that I was just on Tuesday provided
15
       with documentation which is kind of lengthy and complicated.
16
            In the interim, Your Honor, Mr. Dugan will deposit with
       the clerk -- or with the Court the sum --
17
18
            What is it?
19
                 MS. WHITE: 22,000.
20
                 MR. SCHLES: -- $22,000, which would represent the
21
       special assessment, restitution and the individual claim of
22
       restitution. If there were to be some adjustment, any
23
       balance would be refunded. Otherwise, that money would be
24
       turned in for the restitution, Your Honor.
25
                 THE COURT: So insofar as the Court's concerned
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1
       I'll defer any determination with regard to the matter of
2
       restitution to a later date. And I believe that is
 3
       permitted. Otherwise, I'll proceed with sentencing today.
 4
            Is that agreed?
 5
                 MR. SCHLES: That is, Your Honor.
 6
                 MS. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.
 7
            Thank you.
                 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dugan, do you
 8
 9
       understand the contents of that presentence investigation
10
       report?
11
                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do.
12
                 THE COURT: Having reviewed it it appears that the
13
       government has no objections, the defendant has four.
14
       deal with the ones I still need to deal with one at a time.
15
            The defendant objects to paragraph 96, which includes
16
       as a condition of the supervised release that the defendant
17
       not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually
18
       explicit conduct for the purpose of sexual gratification.
19
            Defendant argues that requiring him to refrain from all
20
       sexually explicit material is overbroad.
21
            Anything further argument from either party?
22
                 MR. SCHLES: No, Your Honor.
23
            I've set forth in the sentencing memorandum the basis
24
       for the objection and also some language that has been used
25
       in other cases by courts in recognition of the overbreadth
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       that I believe is reasonable and I ask the Court to adopt
2
       that as a condition.
 3
                 THE COURT: Say again.
 4
            Say that again.
 5
                 MR. SCHLES: Your Honor, the argument is
       essentially that the condition is overbroad because as
 6
 7
       written and defined in the code it includes, you know,
 8
       things that are in the mainstream media. And in the
 9
       sentencing memorandum I had quoted language that has been
10
       used in the past for -- to cover that condition that makes
11
       it clear that it is meant to be limited to things that do
12
       not include simulated sexual contact between adults as you
13
       would see in the mainstream media.
14
                 THE COURT: I'll hear from the government.
15
                 MS. WHITE: Your Honor, I believe that condition
16
       96 is set forth in order to make sure that the defendant
       doesn't maintain materials that would interfere with his sex
17
18
       offender treatment. And so to that extent we believe that
       the condition is reasonable and we would add that in
19
20
       response to what's provided on page 28 of the PSR as the
21
       office of probation's response.
22
            Thank you.
23
                 THE COURT: The statute defines sexually explicit
       conduct to include actual or simulated sexual conduct.
24
25
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Prohibiting the defendant from accessing even simulated

sexually explicit conduct deprives Mr. Dugan of more liberty than is reasonably necessary in my opinion.

I hold that the scope of the condition should not be that broad; that is, it should not include simulated conduct between adults, which is often found in mainstream films and television.

The condition will be modified to read as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the defendant must not view or possess any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture or computer -- or computer-generated image or picture whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other means of sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of sexual gratification and would comprise any sex offense specific treatments. As applied to the defendant the term sexually explicit conduct shall not include adult simulated sexually explicit conduct.

Objection number two, the defendant objects to the conditions in paragraphs 99 and 111 regarding the consumption of alcohol.

Anything further on that?

MR. SCHLES: No, Your Honor, other than while Mr. Dugan admittedly has had a period of time where he was abusing alcohol by his own admission, I don't believe a total prohibition of alcohol for what will be obviously a

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1
       very lengthy term of supervised release is necessary.
2
            I would not have any objection, Mr. Dugan would not
 3
       have any objection, that he shall refrain from excessive
 4
       consumption of alcohol or becoming intoxicated, but as
 5
       written now it would be like a champaign toast at a wedding
 6
       or things like that.
 7
            I think that goes further than is necessary to both
 8
       protect the public and to ensure that Mr. Dugan does not
 9
       abuse alcohol or have any alcohol use contribute to his
10
       treatment.
11
                 THE COURT: Anything from the government?
12
                 MS. WHITE: No, Your Honor.
13
            Thank you.
14
                 THE COURT: I find that requiring the defendant to
15
       refrain from alcohol as a condition of supervised release is
16
       reasonable during that period.
17
            Supervised release conditions are a part of the
18
       restrictions and punishment imposed as a result of the
19
       criminal conviction.
20
            Mr. Dugan has identified a mental health diagnosis of
21
22
23
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25
            After his mother became ill, Mr. Dugan began drinking
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1
       heavily for two or three months. Because of his struggles
2
       with mental health and heavy drinking under prior stressful
 3
       situations, I find that the conditions recommended in
 4
       paragraphs 99 and 111 are reasonable.
 5
            As counsel is well aware, conditions of supervised
 6
       release are always subject to change or amendment upon
 7
       petition to the Court during the period of supervision.
 8
            The defendant objects to the imposition of the $5,000
 9
       special assessment.
10
            Anything further on that?
11
                 MR. SCHLES: No, Your Honor.
12
                 THE COURT: Anything from the government?
13
                 MS. WHITE: Your Honor, we would simply note that
14
       while the defense argues in its brief that the defendant and
15
       his wife are soon to be divorced, in the packet of materials
16
       provided by the defense there is a letter from the wife
17
       indicating that she knows and loves her husband and that
18
       they're best friends.
19
            There's no indication of any pending divorce in those
20
       materials, so we would ask the Court not to take that into
21
       consideration.
22
            The defendant retained private counsel and his finances
23
       are indicative of having the resources to pay that
24
       assessment.
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Thank you, Your Honor.

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                 MR. SCHLES: Your Honor, in terms of the status of
2
       Mr. Dugan and his wife's marriage, I think many
 3
       relationships are complex. You can love someone and be in
 4
       love with somebody and seek a divorce. She is seeking a
 5
       divorce. She has filed for a divorce. It's pending at this
 6
       time.
 7
            As you know, Mr. Dugan obviously is incarcerated.
 8
       Logan County's, I guess, family court has appointed a
 9
       quardian ad litem at this time.
10
            There has been no resolution in terms of a property
11
       settlement or divorce, but the divorce is still there.
12
            My understanding was that that -- in addition to the
13
       $17,000 of individual restitution, that we were just going
14
       to hold that in abeyance for up to 90 days to see if we can
15
       come to an agreement on that or just have the Court
       determine that as coming.
16
17
            I will agree, Your Honor, that --
18
                 THE COURT: You don't think --
19
                 MR. SCHLES: -- as we speak my client is not
20
       indigent on paper. His assets exceed his liabilities.
21
                 THE COURT: Don't you believe the statute requires
22
       me to impose a $5,000 special assessment?
23
                 MR. SCHLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
24
                 THE COURT: Doesn't the statute require me to
25
       impose a $5,000 special assessment?
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MR. SCHLES: The only exception is indigency is my
understanding, Your Honor. And as I say he -- on paper as
we speak he is not indigent. It is more looking forward
prospectively. I understand the Court's position.
          THE COURT: All right. I overrule the objection.
     Finally the objections are to restitution, which we're
going to deal with later.
     Let me say this about some of the issues that maybe
you'll be dealing with on restitution. I received a stack
of letters, statements and so forth about that thick four
days ago. I assume defense counsel didn't receive them any
earlier.
     I don't want to embarrass the Assistant United States
Attorney, but I doubt that if I ask you you could pull out
the exact letter from the exact person for each of the cases
here, could you?
         MS. WHITE: Most respectfully I do have them here,
but we have no objection to handling restitution --
          THE COURT: You have them all?
         MS. WHITE: Yes, sir.
          THE COURT: I understand, but do you have the ones
that just relate to the people that have made claims?
         MS. WHITE: I have those as well as the --
          THE COURT: Can you give me the one that's for --
give me a name.
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            Jenny. Do you have Jenny's handy?
 2
                 MS. WHITE: I'm not sure handy would be the word
 3
       that I would use, Your Honor. I do have the stack here.
 4
                 THE COURT: Yeah, I have the stack as well.
 5
       That's the problem. It's, you know, hundreds of pages of
 6
       things. And if we're going to deal with this appropriately,
 7
       just handing somebody that package without more doesn't
8
       really inform anything.
 9
                 MS. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.
10
                 THE COURT: It took my law clerk a long time to
11
       find me the ones I needed to see.
12
                 MS. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.
13
                 THE COURT: So I suspect -- I just suspected that
14
       these kinds of things come in bulk --
15
                 MS. WHITE: Uh-huh.
16
                 THE COURT: -- to the probation office at the
17
       instance of some bureaucratic mechanism within the
18
       Department of Justice; is that fair?
19
                 MS. WHITE: Yes, it goes through a series of
20
       people and it ultimately ends up in the probation office for
21
       further dissemination. We're grateful for their assistance.
22
            I spoke to Mr. Schles before court. We do agree that
23
       the statute allows 90 days. That's a reasonable request.
24
       And because he's further agreed to put the money at issue in
25
       a trust with the Court, we have no objections to spending a
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       little more time on that issue separate from today's
2
       sentencing.
 3
                 THE COURT: Okay. Well, the whole system is a bit
 4
       bizarre -- the statutory scheme.
 5
            The victim's trust fund with more accountability of
 6
       what happens to these monies and the receipt of them and how
 7
       they're dispersed and so forth would seem to me to be more
 8
       in the interest of justice, but then again I have no
 9
       interest in running for Congress.
10
                 MS. WHITE: That may be above my pay grade, Your
11
       Honor, but I don't disagree with you that the system could
12
       use some improvements.
13
                 THE COURT: For example, you only have like three
14
       or four people who have requested restitution. The amounts
15
       are just round amounts with no -- the standard being
16
       preponderance of the evidence as to what the damages are.
       We don't have an affidavit. We don't have any statement of
17
18
       what the damage is. We don't have anything. And that's
19
       true every time it comes up here.
20
                 MS. WHITE: Uh-huh.
21
                 THE COURT: It just so happens that Mr. Schles is
22
       the first person that's objected. I've wondered about it
23
       for a couple of decades, but --
24
                 MS. WHITE: Well --
25
                 THE COURT: -- in any event I am certain given the
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quality of the lawyers on both sides that you will work it
out and let me know at a hearing to be set by the courtroom
deputy clerk probably after consultation with you fine
lawyers.
     Okay. Any additional objections to the presentence
report?
          MR. SCHLES: The only other objection was simply
to the boilerplate paragraphs stating that the probation
officer found no grounds for a variance, Your Honor, but
that -- we are asking for a variance obviously.
          THE COURT: Well, she didn't find any, which I'll
take her at her word that she didn't find any.
     That doesn't prohibit you from arguing for a variance
and the United States Attorney opposing it and me doing
whatever I think's in the interest of justice, right?
          MR. SCHLES: Correct, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dugan, do you have any
objections to any of the facts contained in the presentence
report not previously addressed?
          THE DEFENDANT: Please repeat the question.
          THE COURT: Do you have any additional objections
to the facts contained in the presentence report not
previously addressed?
          THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I do not.
          THE COURT: Are you completely satisfied with the
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       legal representation you've been provided from the beginning
2
       of that representation through today?
 3
                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
                 THE COURT: I find sufficient indicia of
 4
 5
       reliability to support the probable accuracy of the matters
 6
       contained in the presentence report and the addendum
 7
       thereto.
 8
            I adopt the presentence report and the addendum except
 9
       as otherwise noted.
10
            I direct the probation office to file a copy of the
11
       presentence report in the court file under seal.
12
            The defendant stands convicted of accessing with the
13
       intent to view child pornography.
14
            Federal law provides the following maximum penalties:
15
            A term of imprisonment of 20 years, a period of
16
       supervised release of life, a fine of $250,000, restitution,
17
       a mandatory special assessment of $100, an additional
18
       special assessment of $5,000.
19
            The United States sentencing guidelines are advisory
20
       and are not binding on the Court. I may not presume the
21
       quidelines to be reasonable. Nevertheless, I am required to
22
       carefully calculate and consider the guidelines when
23
       arriving at a just sentence.
24
            I'll do that now.
25
            The relevant U.S. sentencing quideline in this case is
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found in 2G2.2. That provides for a base offense level of 18.

Section 2G2.2(b)(2) provides for a two-level increase if the material involved a prepubescent minor or a minor who had not attained the age of 12 years. Here the defendant possessed material involving children under the age of 12; therefore, a two-level increase is applied. That increases the offense level to 20.

Section 2G2.2(b)(4)(A) provides for a four-level increase if the offense involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence. Here the defendant did possess material involving sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence as reflected in the file names located on his computer. A four-level increase is applied. That increases the offense level to 24.

Section 2G2.2(b)(6) provides for a two-level increase if the offense involved the use of a computer, et cetera. That increases the offense level to 26.

I'm well aware of the perfectly legitimate objections to that enhancement and will consider when I impose my sentence. Nevertheless, I am required to calculate the guidelines as they're written, so that increases the offense level to 26.

2G2.2(b)(7)(D) provides for a five-level increase if

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the offense involves 600 or more images. Here over a
thousand images of child pornography were recovered from the
defendant's hard drive; therefore, a five level increase is
applied. That increases the offense level to 31.
     Again, I'm aware of the circumstance that makes the
number of images problematic and somewhat irrelevant in
light of modern technology.
     Moreover, I have a policy disagreement with the
Sentencing Commission with regard to tying the length of
punishment to the numbers of images, the amount of drugs,
the amounts of money, and all of those formulaic processes.
I honestly have never been able to wrap my head around why
having 599 images is less culpable than having 600 images or
700 for that matter.
     I find for proper calculation the offense level is 31.
     The defendant has no criminal history. That
establishes a criminal history category of one.
     Given a total offense level of 31 and a criminal
history category of one, the advisory guideline range is as
follows:
     A term of imprisonment of 108 to 135 months, a period
of supervised release of five years to life, a fine of up to
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A term of imprisonment of 108 to 135 months, a period of supervised release of five years to life, a fine of up to \$250,000, restitution, and a special assessment of \$100, plus the additional special assessment of \$5,000.

Mr. Schles, anything you or Mr. Dugan would like to

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       proffer with respect to these calculations not previously
2
       addressed?
 3
                 MR. SCHLES: Not with respect to the calculations,
 4
       Your Honor.
 5
                 THE COURT: Ms. White, anything concerning the
       calculations?
 6
 7
                 MS. WHITE: No, sir.
 8
                 THE COURT: Section 3553(a) of Title 18 provides
 9
       several additional factors that the Court must consider when
10
       arriving at a just sentence. The parties have, in their
11
       sentencing memorandum, addressed the 3553(a) factors at the
12
       direction of the Court.
13
            Does either party want to offer additional information
14
       on the 3553(a) factors recognizing I will also give you an
15
       opportunity to speak before I impose sentence.
16
            Mr. Schles, anything on the 3553(a) factors not
17
       addressed in your memorandum?
18
                 MR. SCHLES: Yes, Your Honor.
19
            I would -- I don't want to belabor the statistics and
20
       the arguments as set forth in the written sentencing memo
       that has been submitted. I know this Court is aware and
21
22
       understands the issues that have been raised.
23
            What I would like to do is point your attention to a
24
       case you're well familiar with because you authored it:
25
       United States v. Cruikshank, 667 F.Supp. 697, 2009 decision
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       of this Court.
 2
            And what I'd like to do is simply draw parallels
 3
       between the situation or position of Mr. Cruikshank and that
 4
       of Mr. Dugan for the Court's consideration.
 5
            In both cases the base offense level was 18 for each
       individual. Each received the two-level enhancement under
 6
 7
       2G2.2(b)(2). Each --
 8
                 THE COURT: I've reviewed that decision in
 9
       anticipation of this hearing, but go ahead and make your
10
       record.
                 MR. SCHLES: And also received two levels for
11
12
       2G2.2(b)(6) for use of a computer. On the (b)(7), for the
13
       number of images, Mr. Cruikshank received plus four;
14
       Mr. Dugan receives plus five.
15
            Prior to adjustment under chapter three,
16
       Mr. Cruikshank's total guidelines were 26; Mr. Dugan's is
17
       31. Mr. Cruikshank was a guilty plea case. He received
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       three levels off for acceptance of responsibility.
19
            I fully understand this Court, in calculating the
20
       quidelines, cannot grant a three-level reduction for
21
       acceptance of responsibility, but I know this Court, because
22
       you've done it to me, has expressed in United States v.
23
       Walker and in other cases a preference for public jury
       trials so that the public is aware of what's going on and
24
25
       the transparency.
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And I just would submit, Your Honor, that when somebody does elect to exercise their constitutional right to a trial semantically maybe acceptance of responsibility being denied is not a punishment, but if it results in a higher sentencing range it has the same effect and I would ask the Court to take that into consideration as well.

The largest difference between the two individuals, Mr. Cruikshank and Mr. Dugan, is that Mr. Cruikshank did not receive the four-level enhancement under (b)(4)(A) of 2G2.2.

These are mouthfuls, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's all right.

MR. SCHLES: And if you look at it from that standpoint, four levels up from -- Mr. Cruikshank ultimately received a sentence from this Court of level -- of -- excuse me -- of 24 months, which represents the top end of level 15 for a criminal history category one defendant.

If we were to adjust that here, level 19 and criminal history category is 30 to 37 months, which is the basis for our request for a sentence of 36 months, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think you've made an eloquent argument based on something I decided in a completely separate case, but in listening to it -- and I mean no offense -- I can't help but think it also demonstrates the problem with a formulaic approach to sentencing that does not carefully consider the individual characteristics of

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1
       each defendant and the circumstances surrounding each crime.
2
            So I take your point and it's well made.
 3
                 MR. SCHLES: Well, may I continue, Your Honor?
 4
                 THE COURT: Sure.
 5
                 MR. SCHLES: In determining -- looking at the
 6
       nature and circumstances of the offense, Mr. Cruikshank paid
 7
       for access to an online website. He paid for one month at
 8
       49.95; on one occasion $94.95 for an unspecified amount in
 9
       the case anyway. And it also mentioned that he also
10
       accessed free images on the internet.
11
            Mr. Dugan did not subscribe to any service or pay
12
       anything, but he used the dark website to access in a
       somewhat similar manner to what Mr. Cruikshank did.
13
14
                 THE COURT: Over a more extended period of time as
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       well.
16
                 MR. SCHLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
17
                 THE COURT: Over a more extended period of time as
18
       well.
19
                 MR. SCHLES: I think it was fairly close in the
20
       period of time, Your Honor.
21
                 THE COURT: I'm not sure of that. I just read it
22
       yesterday, but you tell me and I'll stand corrected.
23
                 MR. SCHLES: Also, similarly, Your Honor, neither
24
       Mr. Cruikshank or Mr. Dugan downloaded and saved the images.
25
       In both cases they viewed them on a website and because of
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the operating systems and technical mechanisms built into
the way the systems operated, the images were found in
temporary files. Neither one of them demonstrated the
characteristics of collectors who organize and catalogue and
take extreme measures. Neither one of them had any images
except on one device. Both of them owned multiple devices,
all of which were searched. The images were only found in
the temporary files on one device in each case.

In terms of the history and characteristics of the defendants, Your Honor, neither one had any criminal history. My client has zero criminal history. He had one traffic citation that was dismissed. And he's in his mid-50s, Your Honor. It doesn't get much more spotless than that.

Both gentlemen are married with children -- or a child in my client's case.

Both Mr. Cruikshank and Mr. Dugan have a history of being hard working and gainfully employed successful individuals. Both of them lost their job as a result of their convictions. Both of them have the support of their families.

And in neither case -- and I think this is key. In neither case was there a hint that either one of them had ever even contemplated any kind of physical contact or abuse with a child and that their criminal conduct was, in fact,

limited to sitting in their house and looking at these images.

This Court has recognized that this is a serious offense and we do not question that.

The Court has recognized and many courts have that if it were not for demand there wouldn't be production. That goes for, I guess, all drug crimes, these types of crimes, anything that involves consumption. But, again, no evidence in either case that they have ever had any, any, any contact with children that were inappropriate.

In terms of deterrence, this Court found that 24 months was an adequate sentence to deter others.

In this case 36 months is obviously more than 24 months. So that if 24 months was adequate to deter others in Mr. Cruikshank's case, I believe 36 months serves the same purpose here.

In terms of protecting the public, this Court has recognized the social stigma attached to this offense, the loss of prestige and reputation in one's community. Again, he lost his job. Mr. Dugan, I think the thing he feels worst about is what he's put his family through, the tremendous suffering for his wife and his child and his other family members who are close to him.

I believe that both Mr. Dugan and Mr. Cruikshank represent offenders in the lowest category in terms of

likelihood to be recidivists.

I would also point out that Mr. Dugan undoubtedly is going to be on supervised release for a very long period of time. I expect this Court will impose as conditions of supervised release that he receive sex offender treatment from a licensed and approved provider and that can be ongoing and long term. He will be closely supervised by the Department of Probation.

And given his otherwise spotless criminal record, Your Honor, I think the need to protect the public can be adequately protected with a 36-month sentence.

And in terms of providing any needed correctional treatment or substance abuse or mental health treatment, that can be done better while he is in the community from a licensed professional than can be done during his period of incarceration, although we expect that he will be having that during that too.

And in terms of the kinds of sentences available, both Mr. Cruikshank and Mr. Dugan are class C felons, probation eligible, but as you found in Cruikshank probation would not require or allow for sufficient deterrence to others, Your Honor, and I think that factor would also apply here.

And, again, just finally, Your Honor, I think that your decision in Cruikshank was a very reasonable look at the big picture of you do the numbers; they come out where they do.

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            Again, I wrote a 15-page memo or whatever about that,
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       so I'm not going to go into, but I would ask you to find
 3
       that a sentence of 36 months is sufficient but not greater
       than necessary to fulfill the purposes of 3553(a)(2).
                 THE COURT: Anything further on the 3553(a)
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       factors?
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                 MS. WHITE: I don't need to address anything on
 8
       the factors beyond what I briefed, but I would like an
 9
       opportunity to argue at the appropriate time.
10
                 THE COURT: You certainly will.
                 MS. WHITE: Thank you.
11
12
                 THE COURT: That's where we are right now.
13
            Anything that the government would like to say before I
14
       impose sentence?
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                 MS. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
            I heard Mr. Schles's arguments. I've read his
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       responses. It is true that the defendant lost his job at
18
       the time that he was incarcerated because he's unable to go
19
       to work. That is a fact.
20
            I do understand that he has family support, but what
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       Mr. Schles is arguing is that in another case in another day
22
       with another defendant he received a certain sentence. And
23
       so it follows directly from that in his logic that this
24
       defendant, Mr. Dugan, should also receive a very specific
25
       sentence based upon that other case on another day.
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And while I respect the fact that we do need to have sentences that on some level correlate or relate to one another, I think that Mr. Dugan is a separate and distinct individual.

He stands before you today convicted of accessing with intent to view child pornography. I appreciate Mr. Schles's attempts to downplay what that meant. That's the job he does and he does a very good job at it, but let's be clear. Mr. Dugan sought out the dark web, found specific websites that required membership to access child abuse and sexual exploitation material, and then looked at them over and over and over again.

He told the officers in his statement that he continued to look at them. And then he said this:

I decided to clean it up, so I deleted everything.

So when the defendant argues, well, I didn't have the complex file structure and sorting mechanism of true people who are into child pornography, that argument shouldn't hold weight because we don't see those file structures that the defendant argues don't exist. We don't see them because the defendant deleted all of them.

So I would ask the Court not to give a lot of weight to that argument because it's simply a factual distinction that we have in this case.

I would also -- I would like to respond to Mr. Schles's

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argument that there's no allegations that Mr. Dugan or Mr. Cruikshank's, for that matter, touched any children. I can't speak to the Cruikshank's case. I wasn't the AUSA on that case. But I can tell you that that is the epitome of a red herring. Let me come into court and tell the judge all of the things that I didn't do that I was not charged with to try to convince the judge to give me a break at sentencing. That's irrelevant. He's not charged with touching children in this case and so I don't think the argument that he didn't should in any way allow him to receive a less significant sentence for what he did do and what he does stand convicted of. In addition, I understood in the pleadings that the defendant had several family members very close to him who became ill, ultimately succumbed to their illnesses. And I think that many of us in this courtroom have been in that situation of having family members to care for. It is challenging. It is difficult. But we didn't turn to child pornography to escape that pain.

Those numbers are stunning and they certainly address a completely different public health crisis that we have. And I don't want to take away from the pain that that causes a family, but I do want to carefully and respectfully point out that those family members didn't turn to child pornography. And so while I respect the fact that the Dugan family, like many other families in this courtroom, have had significant challenges, that in no way justifies or explains why he turned to child pornography.

One has nothing to do with the other. There's just no study, there's no indication, there's no research that shows a link between those two. And so we'd ask the Court to give that the appropriate weight at this time.

We don't see -- the government doesn't see a reason for a downward variance or departure in this case. Mr. Dugan told the officers that he did it. He indicated that he was curiosity -- that he was curious, that his curiosity got him, that his life was over and his wife was gonna kill him. He knew what he did was wrong. He tried to cover up his tracks. And when he was unsuccessful to the extent that we still found 1,237 images on his computer, that's what brings him before you today for sentencing. And we'd ask that you give him a sentence within the guideline range in this case.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything that counsel for the defendant or the defendant would like to say before I impose sentence?

MR. SCHLES: Yeah. I would like to briefly respond to Ms. White, Your Honor.

I think Mr. Dugan's past conduct, in terms of criminality, his lack of any evidence or any indication that he had any interest in ever actually abusing a child is highly relevant, Your Honor.

One of the main purposes under 3553(a) is to protect the public. People can commit the crime and for other reasons, characteristics, one person can present a greater need to protect the public from that individual than from another.

And I would submit that Mr. Dugan, the fact that he has never done anything untoward towards any child in his life -- and I'm sure the government looked for that -- is certainly relevant to whether or not he presents a risk of future danger. And the Court should fully consider that in determining the need to protect the public and the length of sentence that is appropriate.

Second, the Court will rely on its recollection as I'm doing. I do not believe Mr. Dugan ever stated that he deleted the images. I believe that he stated something along the lines it got too scarey and he deleted the links

to the websites, not the images himself. There was no evidence that he downloaded the images and then deleted images from his hard drive, Your Honor.

But ultimately I think in terms of all of the 3553(a) factors and looking at the whole picture of the need to protect the public and the need to deter others being major issues, obviously punishment is a part of the sentencing scheme and justly so.

36 months in prison, Your Honor, is not a slap on the wrist. To suggest that that's letting somebody off sending someone to prison for three years at his age for his situation -- or any age -- I shouldn't even say -- that going to prison -- I'm just more used to younger clients, Your Honor, but I find that just not realistic at all.

I believe a sentence of 36 months is adequate. And it does take into account Mr. Dugan's conduct, his character, and his specific actions in this case.

That's all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Dugan.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I'd like to express great sympathy and compassion for all the parties involved. I would just ask that you look at my whole life from before to where I'm at right now to where I'm going to, you know.

I've spent my whole life working for others, pouring my life into them with less regard to myself and more regard to

them. I've -- there's things in my life that people don't even know that, you know, I travel. I would give food away to homeless people and hand out money and just try to do good to anybody and everything and just -- I want you to be able to see those things in me.

I'm a father who is just trying to keep his adult son alive, just give him hope that there's something in this world worth living for. My wife is -- is not -- her health is not great. And I'm going to have to be able to -- no matter what happens between us, I have responsibility to take care of her even if I'm not with her.

This is -- those kind of responsibilities -- and I don't have a whole lot of time left to be able to work and earn and be able to rebuild my retirements. I poured most of all my retirements into my parents taking care of their lives. And they deserved every bit of it, but it was a long sicknesses. My finances dwindled quite a bit. And I -- I promise you that, you know, you'll see a person who's already seeking to help others.

I spent three months in South Central. And every person I've been housed with will tell you that I've spent time even if it was something -- giving them a pack of mustard just to make sure their lives were better for the moment or helping them read their legal papers or just counseling them on the Bible or things like that.

I've put everyone else ahead of me than myself with one -- first time in my life I've had to ask people to put me ahead of them for the moment. I didn't -- I -- I didn't think it would be fair to ask people to help me. I asked my wife and my son to write letters and I understand that almost a dozen of them came in. I didn't ask these people for anything, so I just ask you for mercy.

THE COURT: It's the judgment of the Court the defendant be committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to a term of 54 months.

Upon release from prison the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of five years.

Within 72 hours of release you shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which you're released.

While you're on supervised release you must not commit another federal, state or local offense; you must not possess any dangerous device or firearm; you must not possess any unlawful controlled substance; and you must comply with the standard terms and conditions of supervised release as recommended by the Sentencing Commission and as adopted by this Court, including the special condition that you participate in a program of testing, treatment and counseling for drug and alcohol abuse. That condition may be modified upon motion.

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The probation -- presentence report, rather, sets out
the standard conditions of supervised release as adopted by
this district and optional and special conditions that apply
specifically to your case.
     Have you reviewed those conditions in the presentence
report?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
          THE COURT: Have you talked them over with your
lawyer?
          THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
          THE COURT: I have changed one of them based on an
objection by your lawyer.
          THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh.
          THE COURT: Other than that one, I intend to adopt
all the ones in the presentence report.
     Do you want me to read those to you or will you waive
reading?
          THE DEFENDANT: I would waive it, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Very well.
     I impose and you'll be subject to the conditions as set
out in the presentence report, including the standard
conditions adopted in this district except as previously
noted by the Court.
     As we talked about earlier, the Court requires that the
government prove the amount of restitution by a
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       preponderance of the evidence. Of course, absolute
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       precision is not required when calculating restitution, but
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       you must establish the amount of the individual victims'
       loss with reasonable certainty. See U.S. v. Johnson. It's
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 5
       a Fourth Circuit case from 2017, 680 F. App'x 194.
 6
            You have made me aware of three requests for
 7
       restitution totaling $17,000. I assume that's what you're
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       going to work on are those three requests; is that correct?
 9
                 MS. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: I'll reserve ruling on the issue of
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       restitution pending a hearing.
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            Is there objection to the Court -- well, let me ask my
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       courtroom deputy.
            Should we go ahead and enter the judgment order or do
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15
       we wait for the restitution?
16
                 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK: We go ahead and enter
17
       the judgment order.
18
                 THE COURT: Is that acceptable?
19
                 MS. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.
20
                 MR. SCHLES: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. I'll reserve ruling on the
22
       restitution issues and have a separate hearing on that
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       matter on January 12th, 2023, at 2:30 p.m.
24
            Submit a memo or an agreed statement by December 22nd.
25
            If there isn't agreement, then the government should
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have theirs in by the 22nd and the defendant by the 5th of January, but I'm hoping you'll have an agreed statement.

I may, in fact, be able to dispose -- based on what you submit, I may be able to dispose of the hearing. We'll see.

After considering an appropriate sentence, I've reviewed both the victim impact statements, as I sorted through them, and the letters of support that Mr. Dugan has submitted to the Court.

After considering the advisory guidelines and the factors from 3553(a), I find that the sentence of 54 months, followed by five years' supervised release, is reasonable and appropriate for a number of reasons.

Over the course of several months, Mr. Dugan accessed over a thousand images of child pornography using the dark web, including sadistic and masochistic brutal images. It does not appear from the record that he intentionally saved the images to the hard drive, but I don't know that for sure. And there's no evidence that he distributed the images to anyone else.

Several of the enhancements as I mentioned as we went through them have not kept pace with technological advancement. The U.S. Sentencing Commission found in 2019 that over 95 percent of non-production child pornography offenders received enhancements for use of the computer and for the age of the victims. Given the evolution of

technology today, it's hard to imagine how the instant crime can be committed without the use of the computer.

I'm old enough to remember when the principal purveyor -- and I mean this respectfully and not the way it's going to come out -- was the Postal Service. The postal inspectors would put an ad in other newspapers and people that were interested in that sort of thing wrote in. And then they got the child pornography and then they got arrested. It was sort of like the bizarre To Catch a Predator stuff that we see every day now.

The purpose of the enhancements, in my view, is to target more serious and culpable offenders, but today some of those enhancements that I've discussed apply in most cases and in response most courts, including this one, have increasingly applied downward variances.

Mr. Dugan is 55 years old, no criminal history. He's been diagnosed with hypertension, high cholesterol and arthritis. He's prediabetic. He and his wife have been married for 30 years and they have one child together. The defendant has approximately 20 years of experience as a sales manager. According to his most recent employer, Mr. Dugan's a tireless worker and performed outstanding work. Additionally, Mr. Dugan cared for both of his parents when they became sick and has been described as a good father by his wife and son.

This offense is serious. By paying for access to images of child pornography or by accessing the dark web, Mr. Dugan supported, just by doing it, the creation and distribution of images depicting the sexual abuse of children driving up demand for new images, rewarding those who create them.

I disagree with the argument that his conduct must be punished more severely because he's more likely to physically abuse a child. I have looked at the arguments and the articles written on that and I don't find the evidence such as it is persuasive at all. That's not to say that the crimes are mutually exclusive. They certainly aren't, but the direct connection between this crime and pedophilia is not -- and criminal pedophilia is not a matter of scientific certainty.

So I think this reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment.

The harshness of the sentence for accessing computer-based child pornography aims at deterring others from similar conduct. I find that this sentence, despite being significantly below what's recommended by the guidelines, will provide adequate deterrence. It will protect the public from further crimes of this defendant.

Mr. Dugan's already been punished and will continue to

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       be punished by a strong social stigma in addition to his
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       prison sentence. Incarceration plus societal punishment I
 3
       believe will be adequate to deter Mr. Dugan from
 4
       re-offending.
 5
            Finally, I believe Mr. Dugan's participation in any
 6
       mental health or other treatment programs by the Bureau of
 7
       Prisons is advisable and will aid in his rehabilitation.
       I'd ask that the probation officer also consider counseling
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       directed toward his conduct during his five years of
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10
       supervised release.
11
            Are you in a position to go ahead and pay the $5,100
12
       now?
13
                 MR. SCHLES: Not literally as we speak, but
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       promptly, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: Well, let me just make them due
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16
       immediately and see that they're taken of. There's no point
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       in waiting 90 days for that.
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                 MS. WHITE: Your Honor, if I may interject.
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            I believe that the clerk's office needs an order, you
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       ordering the defendant to pay both the assessment and to pay
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       the restitution in a trust capacity, and further ordering
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       that they be allowed to accept it. So we would ask that
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       that take place either now or at some point during this
24
       proceeding.
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                 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask that the
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       special assessment be paid as in the normal course; that is,
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       it's due immediately.
 3
                 MS. WHITE: Thank you.
                 THE COURT: And he's in jail. I can't really do
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 5
       much else to him except order him to do it.
 6
            With regard to the restitution, I will enter a separate
 7
       order directing that the clerk's office hold -- how much
8
       money?
                 MR. SCHLES: Well --
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10
                 THE COURT: $22,000?
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                 MR. SCHLES: We said 22 earlier, but that included
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       the $5,000, so I guess it would be 17.
                 MS. WHITE: That's correct, Your Honor, 17,000 for
13
14
       restitution.
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                 THE COURT: I will enter an order directing the
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       clerk's office to hold $17,000 in trust pending the Court's
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       determination of the proper amount of restitution in this
18
       case and after the -- that determination to pay the money
19
       according to law.
20
                 MS. WHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.
21
                 THE COURT: Does that work?
22
                 MR. SCHLES: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Mr. Dugan, the only thing you didn't
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       say in your allocution now was to express any sympathy
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       whatsoever for those young children and that disturbs me. I
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       don't think you have recognized how awful this problem is
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       for the families and the people that are impacted by this
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       kind of criminal behavior.
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                 MR. SCHLES: Your Honor, if I may -- if I may
 5
       please interject.
 6
                 THE COURT: Yes.
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                 MR. SCHLES: I believe that was the very first
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       thing that Mr. Dugan said was that he expressed sympathy
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       for everyone involved. He may not have used the term
10
       victims, but I believe that is what he meant to convey to
       the Court.
11
12
                 THE COURT: I heard him say everyone involved.
13
            In any event, I didn't take it as a -- well, I've
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       already imposed the sentence based on what I thought and it
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       didn't have much to do with that. I'd already pretty much
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       made up my mind to that sentence before I walked in here. I
17
       always listen to allocution and the arguments of counsel
18
       before I finally decide on a sentence, but if I didn't do a
19
       little work beforehand I wouldn't be doing my job.
20
            What I'm telling you is that people suffer for the rest
21
       of their lives when they're brutalized to make these
22
       pictures. It's a horrible crime. Let me just give you a
23
       personal example.
24
            I intellectually could relate to the idea of how
25
       horrible it is, but it wasn't until I was forced in a case
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to look at the pictures that I saw how horrible -- I can't find a stronger word -- that situation is. As a consequence you'll catch me not looking unless I'm required to do by the circumstances of the case.

In any event, I don't want you and I don't want your family -- and I don't think they will -- you're well aware of what your wife thinks of this. You knew your life was over because of this. And the social opprobrium that you receive is justified.

Now, having said all of that, which is true, you deserve every bit of punishment you're getting. Having said that, you're going to do that and then you're going to have a life to live. And you're going to have a family whether they're -- whether you're married or you're not married. You're still going to have a family and you're going to have a life in society to live.

Everything about your prior life indicates to me that you can return to being a good citizen of this community, that you can avoid any further problem with matters of this sort. I think that with this aberrant flaw, other than that, I think you're a very good man. There's nothing that convinces me otherwise. So I want you to get out of prison. I want you to get through your supervised release. And I want you to make a good life for yourself.

You may feel like you're getting older, but I can

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assure you from my vantage point you're a young man and
you've got a lot of life ahead of you. And I hope that
you'll use it as you suggest for the benefit of others,
particularly your wife -- or your ex-wife -- and your child.
You owe them every bit of your energy to make their life
good from here on out.
     If you said before it's not about you in the past,
it's really not about you now. It's about making up to them
the horrible pain that you've inflicted on them.
                                                  I'm not
trying to pick on you. I'm just telling you you can do it.
You have the ability to do it. And I think -- I think you
will.
    Good luck to you.
          THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
     Thank you, Your Honor.
     I would apologize for my poor choice of words. I was
just struggling to get them out and I wanted you to know
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I would apologize for my poor choice of words. I was just struggling to get them out and I wanted you to know that sympathy was directed towards them. And I do know -- and I appreciate -- I've heard from other cases that you've been -- that you presided over of your kindness and your determination to see people do better and I truly appreciate that.

THE COURT: Well, I want you to. The whole criminal justice system wasn't set up to be mean. It was set up to protect society and that's what we're about. And

you can be a part of that. You can be a part of the solution, I think.

I can't help but look back at your family and not feel their pain. I have families coming in here every day and that's the -- it's the hardest part.

Now, I'll share something with the lawyers that really doesn't impact on you, but I hate it when defendants bring their little kids here. I really hate that. It doesn't help them a bit and it doesn't help me a bit. I don't -- I think that's pain that doesn't need to be inflicted on children, but be that as it may.

I take it there's no issue with regard to confinement awaiting sentencing?

MR. SCHLES: Yes, Your Honor.

Mr. Dugan would ask the Court to recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that he be confined at the Bureau of Prisons facility in Morgantown. It has the programming that he needs and it would be the most convenient for his family.

THE COURT: I honestly don't know what the Bureau of Prisons is doing now with sex offenders. I want

Mr. Dugan to go somewhere where he's safe. I'll make that recommendation with the understanding that they should substitute their judgment if they believe there's a more appropriate place to assure his safety.

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                 MR. SCHLES: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Anything further?
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                 MS. WHITE: No, Your Honor.
 4
            Thank you.
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                 MR. SCHLES: Your Honor, I believe you need to
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       advise him of his appeal rights.
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                 THE COURT: You know, how often do I forget that?
 8
       Too often.
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            Mr. Dugan, you have a right to appeal this Court's
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       sentence. If you want to do that, you must file a written
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       notice of appeal within 14 days of the entry of the order of
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       sentence and conviction in your case, which is going to be
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       entered right away, not after the restitution.
14
            If you don't file that notice, you won't be able to
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       appeal.
16
            Do you understand?
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                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.
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                 THE COURT: If you do file the notice and I find
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       you don't have sufficient funds to procure documents or
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       transcripts or to hire a lawyer for your appeal those costs
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       will be borne by the United States.
22
            Do you understand?
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                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Anything further to come before the
25
       Court?
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                  MS. WHITE: No, Your Honor.
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            Thank you.
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                  MR. SCHLES: No, Your Honor.
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                  THE COURT: Court's in recess until 1:30.
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          (Proceedings concluded at 11:08 a.m., October 27, 2022.)
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1	CERTIFICATION:
2	I, Kimberly Kaufman, Official Court Reporter, certify
3	that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record
4	of proceedings in the matter of United States of America,
5	Plaintiff v. Raymond Dugan, Defendant, Criminal Action No.
6	2:21-cr-00127, as reported on October 27, 2022.
7	
8	s/Kimberly Kaufman, RMR, CRR, CRC January 15, 2023
9	Kimberly Kaufman, RMR, CRR, CRC
10	
11	
12	
13	CERTIFICATION:
14	I, Kimberly Kaufman, Official Court Reporter, certify
15	that the foregoing is a correct redacted transcript from the
16	record of proceedings in the matter of United States of
17	America, Plaintiff v. Raymond Dugan, Defendant, Criminal
18	Action No. 2:21-cr-00127, as reported on October 27, 2022.
19	
20	s/Kimberly Kaufman, RMR, CRR, CRC March 2, 2023
21	Kimberly Kaufman, RMR, CRR, CRC DATE
22	
23	
24	
25	